Constitutional Law - First Amendment - Enforcement Clause - Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 by Furrer, Melissa M.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 36 Number 4 Article 11 
1998 
Constitutional Law - First Amendment - Enforcement Clause - 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
Melissa M. Furrer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Melissa M. Furrer, Constitutional Law - First Amendment - Enforcement Clause - Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993, 36 Duq. L. Rev. 981 (1998). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol36/iss4/11 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIRST AMENDMENT - ENFORCEMENT CLAUSE -
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT OF 1993 - The United States
Supreme Court held that Congress' passage of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 violated the Enforcement Clause
of the United States Constitution.
City of Boerne v. Mores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
Boerne, Texas, situated northwest of San Antonio, is home to St.
Peter Catholic Church ("St. Peter").' P. F Flores, the Archbishop of
San Antonio ("Archbishop"), granted the St. Peter parish permission
to enlarge the church to accommodate its growing congregation.2
Before the Archbishop applied for the requisite building permit, the
Boerne City Council passed an ordinance empowering Boerne's
Historic Landmark Commission to designate historic landmarks and
historic districts and to approve or deny proposed construction that
would either affect such landmarks or occur in historic districts.3
Shortly thereafter, the Archbishop applied for a building permit, but
the Commission denied his application because St. Peter was
located in one of the historic districts created under the
preservation ordinance.
4
The Archbishop brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas challenging the denial of the
permit as violative of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 ("RFRA). 5 RFRA provides, in pertinent part, that "Government
1. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2160 (1997). The church, built in 1923, is
located 28 miles northwest of San Antonio. Id.
2. St. Peter could seat approximately 230 people; on any given Sunday, 270 to 300
members of the congregation attended a particular mass. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160.
3. Id. The seven stated purposes of the ordinance, Ordinance 91-05, are as follows:
(1) To protect, enhance, and perpetuate selected historic landmarks which represent
or reflect distinctive and important elements of the City's and State's archeological,
cultural, social, economic, ethnic and political history....
(2) To safeguard the City's historic and cultural heritage ....
(3) To stabilize and improve property values in such locations.
(4) To foster civic pride in the beauty and accomplishments of the past.
(5) To protect and enhance the City's attractions to tourists and visitors and provide
incidental support and stimulus to business and industry.
(6) To strengthen the economy of the City.
(7) To promote the use of historic landmarks for the culture, prosperity, education
and general welfare of the people of City and visitors to the City.
Petitioner's Brief at 26-27, City of Boerne v. Flores, 1996 WL 689630.
4. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160.
5. Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 1352
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shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as
provided in subsection (b)."6 The City of Boerne countered the
Archbishop's argument by contending that RFRA was, itself,
unconstitutional.' The district court adopted the City of Boerne's
argument finding, inter alia, that Congress' passage of RFRA
exceeded its power to enforce the provisions set forth in the
Fourteenth Amendment.8 The Archbishop petitioned the court for
interlocutory appeal, which the court granted.' The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found RFRA to be
constitutional, holding that its enactment fell within the scope of
Congress' enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and reversed the decision of the district court.10 The Fifth Circuit
applied the three-prong Morgan test to RFRA and found it to be
constitutional."
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to
address whether Congress had exceeded the scope of its power
under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution when it enacted RFRA.12  Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, held that RFRA did exceed
(1996). RFRA has two stated purposes; the second applies to the Archbishop's claim and
provides "a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened
by government." Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1993).
6. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1993). The
exception set forth in subsection (b) provides that "Government may substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest."
7. Flores, 877 F Supp. 355.
8. Id. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "The
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 5. The other bases on which the district court invalidated
RFRA were that Congress' enactment of the law violated the doctrine of separation of
powers and that the court's enforcement of RFRA would violate the doctrine of stare decisis.
Flores, 877 F Supp. at 357.
9. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160. An interlocutory appeal is one that is necessary
to adjudicate a case on its merits, although the matter appealed is not determinable of the
matter in controversy itself. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 563 (6th ed. 1990).
10. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
11. Id. at 1358. The test, which was advanced in Katzenbach v. Morgan (384 U.S. 641,
1996), provides that a statute is appropriate under Section 5 if (1) it "may be regarded as an
enactment to enforce [the Fourteenth Amendment]," (2) if it is "plainly adapted to that
end[,]" and (3) if it is "consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution." Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966).
12. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1997) (granting certiorari). See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5.
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Congress' powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
The Court began its analysis by examining the context in which
Congress enacted RFRA. RFRA was Congress' response to the
Court's decision in Oregon v. Smith.14 In Smith, the court reasoned
that the application of the Sherbert test to a neutral law of general
applicability was unwarranted. 5  The Sherbert test considers
whether the challenged law substantially burdens a religious
practice and whether some compelling government interest justifies
that burden.' 6 Congress disagreed with the Court's rationale in
Smith and passed RFRA in direct response, going so far as to
articulate the reinstatement of the Sherbert test as one of the
stated purp6ses of RFRA.17 RFRA prohibits the Government from
substantially burdening an individual's exercise of religion, even
when that burden results from a neutral, generally applicable law,
unless the Government demonstrates that the law in question (1)
advances a compelling governmental interest and (2) is the least
restrictive means by which to do so.' 8
Because Congress relied on its Section 5 power to enact RFRA,
the Court considered whether the passage of RFRA was an
appropriate exercise of that enforcement power.19 It is beyond
doubt that Congress is empowered to enact legislation that
enforces the free exercise of religion; however, the Court asserts
that, under Section 5, this is solely a preventive or remedial power
and does not extend to determining when a constitutional right has
13. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172. Justice Kennedy was joined in his majority
opinion by Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, and Ginsberg. Id. Justice Stevens filed a concurring
opinion. fd. Justice Scalia concurred in part and was joined by Justice Stevens. Id. Justice
O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Breyer joined, except as to a portion
of Part I. Id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J, dissenting). Justice Souter wrote a dissenting opinion. Id.
at 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also dissented. Id. at 2186 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
14. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, the Court declined to apply the Sherbert balancing
test to a free exercise challenge against an Oregon state law that criminalized peyote, which
is used by Native Americans as part of their religion. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
15. Id. at 885.
16. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
17. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2161-2162. The RFRAs stated purposes are as follows:
"(1) [T]o restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner [citations
omitted] and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious
exercise is substantially burdened by government." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1993).
18. Id. at § 2000bb-1. Section 2000bb-2(1) provides RFRA applies universally to all
branches, departments, and officials of all state governments as well as the federal
government. Id. at § 2000bb-2(1). Section 2000bb-3(a) mandates retroactive application of
RFRA. Id. at § 2000bb-3(a).
19. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2162.
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been violated or to enacting legislation that changes the meaning of
the right to free exercise of religion. 20 The Court acknowledges the
subtle distinction between preventing or remedying a violation of a
constitutional right and substantively rewriting the law to omit such
a violation but insists the distinction be maintained by requiring
that the means by which a wrong is to be remedied or prevented
and the wrong itself be congruent and proportional.
21
The Court proceeded to distinguish the effect of RFRA from that
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.22 The Voting Rights Act of 1965
served to remedy the systematic discrimination against minority
voters that had been accomplished by the enforcement of facially
"neutral" literacy requirements. 23 RFRA, in contrast, did not remedy
any widespread religious discrimination arising from existing law.24
Because RFRA remedies "incidental" burdens that were never
intended and does so in a very broad manner, potentially intruding
on every law at every level of government, the Court determined
that the necessary connection between the injustice being remedied
and the means by which that remedy was achieved was absent in
RFRA.25 The Court, therefore, reversed the Court of Appeals
judgment and held that RFRA was unconstitutional.
26
Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion, noting that the effect
of the application of RFRA would have granted an impermissible
preference for religion in violation of the First Amendment.27 That
is, the Church would have recourse in response to the zoning
ordinance that an atheist or agnostic would not.28
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in part and
crafted what is largely a response to Justice O'Connor's dissenting
20. Id. at 2163.
21. Id. at 2164. In support of the fineness of this distinction, the Court discusses its
decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, in which it upheld challenged portions of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a necessary remedy to unconstitutional, i.e., pervasively
discriminatory, literacy testing as a prerequisite to voting. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966). The Court shied from any interpretation of Katzenbach v. Morgan that
would validate any Congressional expansion of rights. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966) (upholding the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 despite a New
York State Constitution provision requiring voters to have English-language literacy).
22. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2168.
23. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(e) (1965).
24. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2169.
25. Id. at 2171.
26. Id. at 2172.
27. Id. at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring).
28. Id. Justice Stevens cites Wallace v. Jafree for the proposition that any
governmental preference for religion over irreligion is violative of the First Amendment. Id.
(citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-5 (1985)).
Vol. 36:981984
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opinion.2 9 Justice Scalia examined the historical intent and function
of the Free Exercise Clause by analyzing the free exercise
amendments enacted by the American colonies in the period
preceding the ratification of the Bill of Rights.30 Justice Scalia
determined that the Smith Court's reading of the Free Exercise
Clause as not extending to exempt citizens from obeying laws of
general applicability is consistent with the limited protections to
free exercise of religion provided by the free exercise amendments
and their successor statutes in that those early amendments were
to give way to the government's need to preserve peace and order.31
In addition, Justice Scalia examined the accommodations of
religious practices made by various legislatures and by the
Continental Congress and determined that such accommodation
does not support an inference that the Constitution requires those
exemptions.2 Finally, Justice Scalia looked to the statements made
by the Framers of the Constitution in debates and letters.3 He
stressed that the personally-held beliefs of government leaders that
accommodations should be made to allow and protect the free
practice of religion do not indicate that such accommodations are
constitutionally mandated.3
Justice O'Connor, joined in part by Justice Breyer, authored a
dissenting opinion in which she relied on the above-mentioned
historical documents, to assail Smith and its departure from the
Sherbert test as a misinterpretation of Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence.m Justice O'Connor would have read the Free
Exercise Clause as affirmatively guaranteeing the right to practice
one's religion without governmental interference, even interference
resulting from a neutral law of general application. 6 She looked to
historical materials to define "free exercise" and to support her
position that the Framers intended the Bill of Rights not only to
protect free exercise but also to limit government intrusion on
individuals' religious practices.37
Finally, Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion in which he
questioned the precedential value of the Court's decision in Smith
29. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2176 (Scalia, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 2172 (Scalia, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 2173 (Scalia, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 2172 (Scalia, J., concurring).
33. Id.
34. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2174-75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 2177 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 2179 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
1998
Duquesne Law Review
and acknowledged the weight of Justice O'Connor's understanding
of the historical materials examnined.38 Justice Souter stopped short
of joining either the dissent or the majority opinion, however,
because the Court had not entertained briefs and arguments on the
merits of the case and he was disinclined to rule on the issue
without reargument.3 9
An examination of its Free Exercise Clause and Enforcement
Clause jurisprudence aids an understanding of the Court's decision.
In Ex parte Virginia,4° the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of an act of Congress making it a felony for a
judge to prevent an otherwise-qualified citizen from serving on a
jury solely on the basis of race. Because enforcement of the state
act would advance the objectives of the Fourteenth Amendment by
enabling African-Americans to exercise their right (and duty) as
citizens to serve as jurors, the Court held that the act was an
appropriate use of Congress' broad Enforcement Clause powers to
enforce- the objectives of the Fourteenth Amendment. 41 This
decision amounted to judicial acknowledgment of the broad nature
of Congress' powers under Section 5.42
Four years later, in the Civil Rights Cases,43 the Court
articulated the inherent limitations on Congress' power and
determined the nature of that power to be remedial and preventive.
The Court considered the Civil Rights Act of 1874, which made it a
crime to deny a person access to public accommodations on the
basis of race, finding that the Act exceeded Congress' enforcement
power by attempting to regulate private conduct. 44 Under the
Enforcement Clause, the Court explained, Congress was authorized
to enact only corrective legislation, i.e., that which would be
necessary and proper to counter state laws violating the Fourteenth
Amendment. 45 Under this analysis, the Civil Right Act failed
because it was directed at the behavior of private citizens.
46
Modem consideration of Congress' powers under the
Enforcement Clause began in earnest in 1940. Cantwell v.
38. Id. at 2185-86 (Souter, J., dissenting).
39. City of Boerne at 2186 (Souter, J., dissenting).
40. 100 U.S. 339, 344 (1879).
41. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 339.
42. Id. at 346.
43. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
44. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S at 13. See also Civil Rights Act of 1874, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983 (1874).
45. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 14.
46. Id. at 15.
Vol. 36:981
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Connecticut established the limit on Congress' power to enforce
the right to free exercise of religion.47 In CantweU, Jehovah's
Witnesses challenged a statute that completely prohibited
solicitations by organizations other than those licensed by the state
of Connecticut as religious, charitable, or philanthropic.48 The Court
acknowledged that the right to free exercise of religion is not
absolute and that imposing general and nondiscriminatory
regulations empowers the states to regulate that exercise.
49
However, the Court struck down the statute, holding that the
definition of fundamental liberties encompasses the rights
protected under the First Amendment, including the right to free
exercise of religion, protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. 5°
CantweU is significant because the inclusion of freedom of religion
as a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment places that
right squarely within the ambit of Congress' enforcement powers.
Until recently, the leading case establishing the limits that may
be placed on a citizen's free exercise of religion has been Sherbert
v. Verner.51 In Sherbert, the Court considered a South Carolina
statute, which defined the eligibility requirements for
unemployment compensation, as applied to a Seventh-Day
Adventist, whose religious beliefs prevented her from accepting
employment that would entail working on Saturday, her Sabbath.
52
The Court recognized the First Amendment right to exercise of
religion free of governmental interference, which is extended to
interference by state government through the Fourteenth
Amendment, and applied a balancing test to determine whether,
through the statute, South Carolina enforced or advanced a
compelling state interest justifying its substantial infringement on
the right to free exercise of religion protected by the First
Amendment.5 The Court held that the statute in question was an
unconstitutional infringement on that right because it failed the
47. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
48. CantweU, 310 U.S. at 301.
49. Id. at 304 (noting that states are empowered to regulate, within reason, the time,
place, and manner of activities protected under the First Amendment).
50. Id. at 303, 306.
51. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
52. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398. The South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act
provided that a would-be claimant who refused "available suitable work" without "good
cause" was not eligible to receive benefits. 68 S.C. CODE § 68-114(3) (1952).
53. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. Furthermore, the state's infringement was compuneded
by the discriminatory nature of the statute (claimants were not required to accept
employment requiring them to work on Sundays) and the state's failure to identify less
restrictive alternatives to the statute in question. Id.
1998 987
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applicable balancing test; i.e., the state's interest in preventing
fraudulent benefits claims did not outweigh the claimant's right to
observe her religious Sabbath. 4
Modem decisions have also focused on the requirement that
legislation enacted pursuant to Congress' Section 5 enforcement
powers be remedial. The Court's analysis of South Carolina v.
Katzenbach emphasized "historical experience" in determining
whether the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was a constitutional exercise
of Congress' Section 5 powers.5 The Court reviewed evidence of
"subsisting and persuasive" discrimination in the use of literacy
tests by states to prevent minorities from exercising their right to
vote.56 In light of that historical evidence, the Court found the
Voting Rights Act provisions prohibiting such literacy testing to be
a necessary and proper legislative response intended to remedy
widespread discrimination; as such, the provisions were within
Congress' enforcement powers.
57
That same year, the Court addressed the constitutionality of yet
another provision of the Voting Rights Act in Katzenbach v.
Morgan.5 The section in question prevents states from forbidding
citizens from voting when they are not English-literate but have at
least a sixth-grade education. 59 The Court upheld the statute as it
applied to an unconstitutionally discriminatory provision of the
New York State Constitution but clearly tied the propriety of the
preventive remedy to the history and depth of the wrong being
corrected. 6° The provision in the New York State Constitution was
intended to prevent Hispanic minorities from exercising their right
to vote. The Morgan Court broadly read Section 5 as a positive
grant of power to Congress to legislate as it saw fit to protect
rights set forth under the Fourteenth Amendment. 61 According to
the Court's reading of Section 5, if Congress' legislation meets the
standard set forth in McCullough v. Maryland, courts will deem it
appropriate legislation under the Enforcement Clause.62
54. Id.
55. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). See also Voting Rights Act
of 1965, § 4(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1073b(e) (1965).
56. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 333-34.
57. Id. at 313.
58. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
59. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1073b(e) (1965).
60. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 658.
61. Id. at 651.
62. Id. at 651. The Court in McCuUough determined that Congress' act to establish a
federal bank was a "necessary and proper" legislative action consistent with the Constitution.
988 Vol. 36:981
City of Boerne
In 1970, amendments to the Voting Rights Act sparked additional
litigation, and the Court considered whether those amendments
were within Congress' enforcement powers.6 The Court upheld
amendments that abolished literacy and residency requirements as
within Congress' Section 5 powers to prescribe and regulate voting
qualifications.6 The Court also narrowed Congress' power by
holding that, although the amendment enfranchising eighteen year
olds in federal elections was within its power, the amendment
seeking to do the same in state and local elections exceeded the
scope of Congress' power, Morgan notwithstanding.6
A broad reading of Congress' enforcement powers prevailed in
City of Rome v. United States.6 The Rome Court held that a Voting
Rights Act provision requiring local governments that fall within
certain coverage criteria to submit any proposed changes to
approval by the electorate was a constitutional exercise of
Congress' Enforcement Clause powers.67 The Court held that even
state practices that do not, themselves, violate the United States
Constitution can be prohibited by Congress when appropriate; i.e.,
necessary and proper.68
Such was the evolution of the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence,
which was centered largely around protection of civil rights. In
1990, in Oregon v. Smith, the Court declined to apply the Sherbert
balancing test to an Oregon drug law making it a crime to use
peyote.6 Because Oregon criminalized the use of peyote, the Free
Exercise Clause did not protect Native American church members
who were deemed ineligible for state unemployment compensation
benefits after they had been dismissed for the sacramental use of
peyote.70 The Court distinguished Sherbert because that decision
applied the balancing test to analyze, not to invalidate, free
exercise challenges.7 1 Holding the balancing test and its compelling
interest requirement inapplicable to a neutral statute of general
Id. See McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
63. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). The amendments gave eighteen-year-old
individuals the right to vote and abolished literary tests and state residency requirements for
presidential elections. Id.
64. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 112.
65. Id.
66. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
67. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 162.
68. Id.
69. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876. See also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
70. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
71. Id. at 884-85.
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applicability designed to prohibit criminal conduct, the Smith Court
found that no individual should be permitted to disobey such laws
on the basis of his or her religious beliefs.7 2 The Court rejected the
compelling interest test specifically to avoid the result mandated by
RFRA; i.e., the presumptive invalidity of any statute when in
conflict with any religious belief.73
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,74
the Court reversed lower court decisions that held city ordinances
prohibiting the sacramental slaughter of animals were not violative
of the Free Exercise Clause. The Court held that the ordinances
did violate the rights of people who practice the religion of
Santeria and applied a strict scrutiny standard to the ordinances
because they were neither neutral nor generally applicable but,
rather, were aimed directly at religious animal sacrifice.
7 5
Congress' passage of RFRA was intended to evade strict scrutiny
as applied to generally applicable, neutral statutes. The Court
necessarily struck down RFRA because it was entirely inconsistent
with Free Exercise and Enforcement Clause jurisprudence. The
Court seemed bent on protecting the states from a wholesale
intrusion on their police powers by Congress through RFRA.
Although the Boerne Court's analysis of Section 5 jurisprudence
allows it considerable discretion to determine on a case-by-case
basis when a statute impermissibly infringes on an individual's
religious freedom, that same discretion could ultimately undermine
the very protection intended. The Court acknowledged that the line
between enforcing a right and changing what that right means is
blurred and faint. By endorsing a subjective test and granting
Congress considerable deference to enforce the right to free
exercise, the Court has created a situation that will almost certainly
result in inconsistent decisional law.
The alternative, however, would have been even less palatable.
Had the Court not invalidated RFRA, individual citizens would have
been able to simply pick and choose which state regulations would
apply to them. It is clear, therefore, that a blanket protection such
as RFRA far exceeds the scope of Congress' enforcement powers.
72. Id. at 885.
73. Id. at 888.
74. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
75. Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 520. The Santeria religion espouses animal sacrifice, in which
the animals are killed, cooked, and -eaten following the majority of Santerian rites; the Court
found that the Hialeah ordinances in question, taken as whole, although facially neutral,
were actually aimed at suppressing the Santerian practice of animal sacrifice. Id.
Vol. 36:981
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The challenge for the Court now is to devise a stronger, more
objective test by which to analyze those statutes that are less
patently unconstitutional.
The continued assertion of RFRA in the arena of federal
governmental regulation, in the months since the Court's decision
illustrates the need to do so. In December of 1997, both the United
States, as plaintiff, and an individual defendant in one case urged
the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico to
revisit the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to the federal, and
not state or local, government. 76 In Sandia, the defendant had been
prosecuted for the illegal possession and sale of various body parts
of federally-protected birds. 77 Both Sandia and the United States
argued that the Boerne Court's decision did not extend to invalidate
the application of RFRA to federal governmental regulations. 78 The
Sandia Court rejected this notion and held that, regardless of
whether Congress relied on its Section 5 powers, its Article I
powers, or both to enact RFRA, the Boerne Court found RFRA to
be unconstitutional and, as a matter of law, RFRA cannot be
asserted as a defense to the violation of a federal governmental
regulation.79
In marked contrast to the Sandia Court's decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether
RFRA was constitutional as applied to federal governmental
regulations and held that it was.80 In Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church,8' the Eighth Circuit held that, under
RFRA, tithing to one's church could not constitute an avoidable
transaction in a bankruptcy proceeding.
82
After its decision in Boerne, the Supreme Court vacated the
Eighth Circuit's decision, remanding the case for reconsideration in
76. United States v. Sandia, No. CR 99-717 MV, 1997 WL 894538 (D.N.M. Dec. 22,
1997).
77. Sandia, 1997 WL 894538, at *1. Sandia, a member of the Jemez Pueblo tribe of
Native Americans, was prosecuted under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703
(1997), the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1985), and the Lacey Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-78 (1997). Id. (The Lacey Act makes it unlawful to "import, export,
transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any ... wildlife ... taken, possessed,
transported, or sold in violation of [any federal or Indian tribal law.]" 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at *3.
80. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, No. 93-2267, 1998 WL 166642 (8th
Cir. (Minn.) Apr. 13, 1998).
81. 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996).
82. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 82 F3d 1407, 1420 (8th Cir. 1996).
1998
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light of Boerne.3 On reconsideration, the Eighth Circuit relied on
the constitutionality of Congress' exercise of its Article I powers to
hold that RFRA is constitutional as applied to the federal
government and reinstated its decision.84
The constitutionality of RFRA as applied to federal governmental
regulation was also addressed in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In Gunning v. Runyon,85 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida considered
whether the refusal of the administrators of a branch of the United
States Postal Service to play a Christian radio station over the post
office's public address system despite the requests of employees
violated RFRA. The Gunning Court noted that it believed that the
constitutionality of RFRA as applied to federal governmental
regulations remained an open question.86 The Gunning Court
assumed that RFRA was a viable defense.
8 7
Although the continued reliance on RFRA stems in part from the
Boerne Court's silence as to its applicability to federal regulations,88
it seems likely that the district and circuit courts feel compelled to
so interpret the Boerne Court's silence given the lack of an
alternative, specific test to apply to federal regulations. If the Court
were to devise a concrete test for determining whether a statute
(be it federal, state, or local in nature) violated the First
Amendment right of free exercise of religion, RFRA could be put to
rest.
Melissa M. Furrer
83. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
84. Christians, 1998 WL 166642, at *1.
85. No. 96-0452-Civ., 1998 WL 199654 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 1998).
86. Gunning v. Runyon, No. 96-0452-Civ., 1998 WL 199654, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 17,
1998).
87. Gunning, 1998 WL 199654, at *10.
88. See, e.g., Magic Valley Evangelical Free Church, Inc., v. Fitzgerald, No.
96-0458-E-BLW, 1998 WL 173065 (D. Idaho Apr. 3, 1998) (holding that the Supreme Court's
silence on the matter should be interpreted so as to signify RFRAs constitutionality as
applied to federal regulations, but noting that the question was open to interpretation).
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